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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
Gordon Linkon*
Results of a Lie Detector Test Not Admissible in Evidence-In a trial for
murder a police officer testified that while interrogating the defendant, and
prior to his confession, portions of the defendant's lie-detector test record
had been pointed out to him as evidence of his lying. Leeks v. State, 245
P.2d 764 (Okla. 1952). The court declared this evidence inadmissible because
its effect was to inform the jury of the exact results of the lie-detector test,
and since the test results are not judicially recognized it is error to project
the results into a criminal case trial.
It is interesting to note, however, that the court goes on to say that the
use of a lie-detector is not to be excluded as an instrument of investigation.
Nor does it mean that its use may not be shown as a step leading up to a
confession, that is, so long as the exact results are not brought out by either
the state or the defendant. See also Henderson v. State, 230 P.2d 495 (Okla.
1951) (cited by the court).
Identity by Voice Recognition-In Henderson v. State, 71 S.E.2d 628 (Ga.
1952), the defendant, charged with murder, had been identified by a witness
on the basis of his color, size, and voice. The testimony reveals that the
witness was not previously familiar with the defendant's voice. She heard
the voice of the man who perpetrated the crime; she did not know him or
his voice at that time. She later heard the voice of the accused, and in
her opinion, it was the same. The court pointed out that personal identity
of an accused may be established by the testimony of a witness that he was
familiar with his voice and recognized it. In the instant case, however, the
witness was not previously familiar with the accused voice and, therefore,
her opinion, having heard him talk since the crime, could not be accepted as
identity by voice recognition.
Regarding the general unreliability of voice identifications, see article by
McGehee, 17 J. GEN Psy. 249 (1937).
Search as an Incident to an Unlawful Arrest-The Florida police have
unsuccessfully attempted to use traffic violation arrests to create the "search
incident to a lawful arrest" situation. In Burley v. State, 59 So.2d 744
(Fla. 1952), the evidence showed that the police suspected Burley of having
connections with illegal lotteries, but they had no real reason to arrest
Burley. The police, knowing that Burley drove a black Pontiac, waited for
him to drive by on the highway. When Burley did drive by, they followed
him, hoping he would violate some traffic law so the could arrest him. Burley
passed a car and a truck on a curve. The police arrested him and thereupon
searched his car. The search revealed the lottery tickets. The court took
the position that since the curve on which Burley passed the car and truck
was not in a "no passing zone" the arrest was illegal, and being so, the
search was illegal.
In Graham v. State, 60 So.2d 186 (Fla. 1952), a similar fact situation
occurred. The police suspected Graham of possessing lottery tickets; they
waited beside the road for her to drive by and arrested her for reckless
driving. After the arrest the police searched her person and her car and
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found the lottery tickets. The police attempted to justify the reckless driving
arrest on the ground that Graham had repeatedly crossed the center line.
There was no claim that she had speeded, that traffic was heavy, or that she
had endangered herself, her automobile or any other person or property of
any other person. There was no claim that she was driving on a curve or
over a hill. The court concluded that the traffic violation arrest was unlawful
and, therefore, the search of the person and automobile as incident thereto
was unlawful and unreasonable.
In neither of these cases did the court point out what would have happened
had the arrest been justifiable as a traffic violation arrest. Would the
searches then have been held reasonable. The court appears to say yes
by stressing the fact that the violations were not actual, and having little
regard for the fact that these arrests were planned.
In McKnight v. United States, 183 F.2d 977 (D.C. 1950), however, where
the police, possessing a warrant for McKnight's arrest, waited for him to
enter a house before arresting him so they could search the house as an
incident to the arrest, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held the search to be unreasonable. The Supreme Court has specially held
that "An arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence."
United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932).
